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Abstract—The computer security community has advocated
widespread adoption of secure communication tools to protect
personal privacy. Several popular communication tools have
adopted end-to-end encryption (e.g., WhatsApp, iMessage), or
promoted security features as selling points (e.g., Telegram,
Signal). However, previous studies have shown that users may
not understand the security features of the tools they are using,
and may not be using them correctly. In this paper, we present a
study of Telegram using two complementary methods: (1) a lab-
based user study (11 novices and 11 Telegram users), and (2) a
hybrid analytical approach combining cognitive walk-through
and heuristic evaluation to analyse Telegram’s user interface.
Participants who use Telegram feel secure because they feel
they are using a secure tool, but in reality Telegram offers
limited security benefits to most of its users. Most participants
develop a habit of using the less secure default chat mode at all
times. We also uncover several user interface design issues that
impact security, including technical jargon, inconsistent use of
terminology, and making some security features clear and others
not. For instance, use of the end-to-end-encrypted Secret Chat
mode requires both the sender and recipient be online at the same
time, and Secret Chat does not support group conversations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent events have seen developers offering messaging
tools with greater security to support a diverse range of user
motivations. These include revelations about mass surveil-
lance and the potential for user tracking in communication
tools (e.g., Facebook’s tentative plans to use WhatsApp user
data [30]). End-to-end (E2E) encryption has been adopted in
several messaging tools (e.g., WhatsApp, iMessage), whereas
other tools have positioned security as a key selling point
∗Authors contributed equally.
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(e.g., Telegram, Signal). Security-related features may differ
in how much they involve the user, whereas differences in the
visibility of security features can create problems and impact
user trust in a messaging tool [52], [53]. Telegram1 is unique in
offering separate modes of communication with differing levels
of security. However, it may be difficult for users to distinguish
between these modes and make effective use of them [31].
Users may explore the functionality of a messaging tool, or
identify features that satisfy specific goals (which may or may
not relate to security, such as sharing sensitive information
with others). Users new to a security tool may also use it in
ways that are not anticipated by developers [46].
Here, we explore the motivations and security behaviours
of using a messaging tool that claims to be secure, specifically
those who have not used Telegram before and those who are
familiar with the tool. We combine two research techniques:
(1) a novel lab-based user study with 11 novices and 11
participants with prior experience of using Telegram, and (2) a
usability inspection bringing together cognitive walk-through
and heuristic evaluation, focusing on Telegram’s UI. This
approach has been applied before in the area of usable security,
most notably by Whitten and Tygar [62] to evaluate PGP 5.0.
Here, we have planned a lab-based study that uses a set of tasks
to elicit user perceptions of Telegram. The usability inspection
complements this by allowing us to look at issues not touched
upon by those tasks or not reported by our participants.
Prior work has focused on novices, with the admirable goal
of identifying barriers to adoption [52], [62]. Studies of secure
communication tools have rarely involved non-novices, where
these users can identify the motivations for adopting and using
security features in practice. Participants brought their mobile
devices to the lab. Novices installed Telegram to explore
its features by way of a ‘sensitive payment information’
messaging scenario. Prior users of Telegram were similarly
involved in the task, but as an opportunity to see how they
have used the tool and the role of Telegram’s various security
features in these practices, such as the Secure Chat mode. In
both cases, scenario tasks were used to promote discussion as
part of semi-structured interviews. Use of a System Usability
Scale (SUS) questionnaire further explored the usability of the
tool for novices and users alike. We found that both groups
1 https://telegram.org/
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associated high SUS scores with Telegram, even where prior
users had been found to use a few features – including security
features – in practice.
Comparing the initial impressions of novices with the
experiences of non-novices illustrated that in practice there
may be at most partial adoption of Telegram and its se-
curity features by regular users. The participants with prior
experience of Telegram tended to abandon the tool despite
believing it was usable, adopting a communication tool which
was more popular with the people they wanted to remain in
contact with. Similarly, participants would benchmark Tele-
gram and its features against a favoured communication tool
(e.g., WhatsApp). For both groups, when participants wanted
to exchange sensitive information, they would use a mix of
communication channels (such as calling a person’s phone or
meeting in person), rather than exclusively using even a trusted
tool, such as Telegram (and indeed other messaging tools).
The consistency of information for users was also a source
of issues for both novices and non-novices. Participants did not
generally understand that Telegram’s Secret Chat mode does
not support group conversations, nor that the communicating
parties are required to be online at the same time. This leads
to recommendations to practitioners, foremost that usability
engineering principles (such as those advocated by Nielsen
and Molich [45]) must be followed consistently, or they risk
leading users into using tools in such a way that the security
properties become unclear.
II. RELATED WORK
Secure communication tools became widely available with
the release of PGP in 1991 [63], designed for asynchronous,
high-latency email communications. This led to a large ecosys-
tem of PGP tools [1], [2], [5]. The release of OTR [3] in 2004
in turn addressed low-latency messaging environments, such as
chat clients, and introduced additional security features, such
as forward secrecy and deniability. The emergence of OTR has
also led to a range of secure communication tools [7], [10],
[11], [27], [41], [57], including the Signal protocol [4], which
has recently gained popularity [4].
The use of self-destructing messages was popularised by
Snapchat, released in 2011. This was seen by users as ad-
dressing their security and privacy needs, though motivated
attackers remain a problem, as does secure data deletion in
messaging [26], [47], [49]. There is also uncertainty as to
whether tool providers are able to uphold assurances around
security in the face of, for example, government requests for
data [51]. We refer the reader to Unger et al. [60] for a detailed
review of the literature on secure communication tools.
The main user interface (UI) challenge for E2E-encrypted
messaging tools is seen as being trust establishment [60],
which is often reduced to verifying ownership of cryptographic
keys in some fashion. In traditional PKI, this assurance is
delivered in the form of a signed certificate from a trusted
authority [33]. There are, however, many issues with this
certificate management, including key storage, distribution and
revocation [28]. The most widely-deployed E2E-encrypted
tools (e.g., iMessage, WhatsApp, Signal) shield users from key
management, by using a trusted server that vouches for the
authentic public keys of other users. Recent proposals attempt
to limit the trust in these servers using transparency logs [42],
[54].
The smartphone era has seen an explosion of new com-
munication tools to support the sharing of messages. Many of
these tools may claim to be secure, but lack specific security
guarantees or adequate grounding in existing cryptographic
literature [16], [60]. Responses have emerged in the commu-
nity, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) Secure
Messaging Scorecard, aiming to provide objective information
about secure communication tools and their features. User
comprehension and adoption of security-related features persist
as barriers to secure communications.
Lack of usability can hamper both the adoption of secure
communication tools and their effectiveness during use. In their
seminal paper [62], Whitten and Tygar assessed whether PGP
5.0 could be used effectively by non-specialist users to secure
their email. Analysis was informed by a hybrid analytical
approach combining cognitive walk-through [39] and heuristic
evaluation [45], alongside a lab-based user study. Security-
related problems were identified in the UI (e.g., irreversible
errors, lack of consistency and feedback). Only one-third of
participants were able to correctly sign and encrypt their
email messages during a 90-minute session; it was concluded
that to be usable, security needed domain-specific UI design
principles and techniques.
Similarly, Garfinkel and Miller studied CoPilot, a pro-
totype email client based on Key Continuity Management
(KCM) [24]. KCM attempts to reduce user effort and potential
for error by automating key generation, key management, and
message signing. Garfinkel and Miller concluded that KCM
is a workable model for improving email security, and that
the UI of CoPilot enables users to send protected emails
easily because, for example, it visually distinguishes encrypted
emails from unencrypted ones. Ruoti et al. studied Private
Webmail (Pwm) and Message Protector (MP) [53]. They found
that users trusted MP more than Pwm because with MP they
“could see the ciphertext” after encryption had taken place,
equating this with protection.
More recently, Ruoti et al. tasked pairs of novices to send
encrypted emails using a range of email tools [52]. It was
found that trust in the system was reduced when security
properties were hidden from users. The authors concluded that
integrated encryption solutions increase usability, but that com-
plete transparency is counterproductive. The need for visible
feedback matches the findings of Whitten and Tygar [62] as
well as the “visibility of system status” usability engineering
principle encouraged by Nielsen and Molich in 1990 [45].
Bai et al. investigated whether non-expert users can evalu-
ate the security trade-offs between a traditional key-exchange
model (analogous to PGP) and a registration model (analogous
to iMessage) [8]. Participants preferred (and also trusted) the
apparently more usable, but less secure, registration model
for “everyday communications”. Bai et al. concluded that
designers ought to explain the security properties of their
encryption tools.
Gaw et al. explored the social context behind users’ deci-
sions about whether and when to encrypt emails [25]. They
interviewed members of an activist organisation under the
presumption that the organisation’s employees would have
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a strong incentive to encrypt emails. They found that the
perception of encryption behaviour by others (e.g., use of
encryption for protecting secrets is seen as “justified”, for gen-
eral communications as “paranoid”) influenced participants’
decision to adopt encrypted email.
Renaud et al. proposed seven possible explanations for the
non-adoption of E2E encryption in email [50]. They identified
key factors for non-adoption, which included usability issues,
incomplete threat models, misaligned incentives, and lack of
understanding of the email architecture. They concluded that
security researchers should focus on building “comprehensive
mental models of email security”.
Dourish et al. studied how users experience and practice
security as an “everyday, practical problem” [21]. We here
aim to understand users’ security practices and needs, and the
background against which they decide to use or stop using a
messaging tool that claims to be secure.
III. TELEGRAM
Telegram is an IM tool launched in 2013. Client appli-
cations exist for both desktop (e.g., OS X, Windows) and
mobile systems (e.g., Android, iPhone). Telegram supports
the exchange of messages, photos, videos and files between
individual users or groups of users. In February 2016, Telegram
announced that they had more than 100 million monthly active
users, generating 15 billion messages daily.
Telegram accounts are tied to phone numbers, verified via
an SMS message or a phone call. Users can create an alias
(public username) to limit exposure of their phone number.
A passcode can be used to lock an account, and multiple
devices can be linked to a single account. An optional “two-
step verification” feature requires a password in order to access
an account from a new device (in addition to the verification
code). Users can delete their accounts manually. Otherwise, an
account is automatically deleted after a period of inactivity.
Telegram has been launched with security as a key sell-
ing point. Telegram offers both a default chat mode and a
Secret Chat mode. Messages sent within the default mode
are cloud-based and stored on Telegram’s servers, supporting
synchronisation of messages across a user’s connected de-
vices; in this mode, messages are encrypted in transit using
client-server/server-client encryption. In contrast, messages
exchanged within the Secret Chat mode are E2E-encrypted,
and can only be accessed from the originating device (i.e.,
not cloud-based). When a Secret Chat session is initiated, par-
ticipating devices exchange a long-term encryption key using
Diffie-Hellman key exchange [20]. After an E2E-encrypted
session has been established, communicating devices use this
key to exchange encrypted messages using a symmetric en-
cryption protocol, called MTProto.
When a Secret Chat session has been established, both
an image and a textual visualisation are generated on both
the sender and recipient’s devices, visualising their public
key fingerprints. Communicating parties would verify each
other’s identities by comparing both representations through a
trusted channel (e.g., in person). If the representations match,
the session is secure, and a man-in-the-middle attack has not
occurred. Users can initiate different Secret Chat sessions with
the same contact. Telegram claims that secret chats can be
deleted at any time, and can, in principle, self-destruct, i.e.,
disappear from both the sender and recipient’s devices after a
period of time, without storing a copy of exchanged messages
on Telegram’s servers. Users have the option to set the “self-
destruct timer” to the desired time limit. Secret chats cannot
be forwarded to other users, and, according to Telegram, leave
no traces on the servers.
Telegram’s client-side code is open-source, whereas its
server-side code is closed-sourced and proprietary. The EFF
Secure Messaging Scorecard provides information to non-
expert users about the security features offered by various
messaging tools [22]. Currently, the EFF Scorecard gives
Telegram’s default chat mode a rating of four out of seven
points, and the Secret Chat mode seven out of seven. How-
ever, more recent audits have revealed that Telegram has
a wide range of security issues that might compromise its
integrity as a secure messaging tool [34]. Telegram uses its
own “home-brewed” encryption protocol, MTProto, rather than
well-studied, provably-secure encryption schemes that achieve
strong definitions of security (and that are at least as efficient).
The tool also leaks meta-data, which may allow an attacker to
determine when a user is online and offline, when they use the
tool, and where they are located [58].
IV. STUDY AIMS
The aim of our study was to evaluate the user experience
of Telegram and its security features. We were interested in
two main aspects, specifically its usability and the factors for
adoption. We chose Telegram because it was launched with
security as a key selling point, and has recently gained signif-
icant popularity. That the Telegram architecture distinguishes
between two distinct chat modes further facilitated exploration
of user perceptions and motivations around secure messaging:
messages sent within the default chat mode are encrypted
in transit, whereas within the Secret Chat mode are E2E-
encrypted. Abu-Salma et al. [6] found that participants who
reported using Telegram to send sensitive information had been
doing so using the less secure default chat, rather than the
Secret Chat, mode.
Studies summarised in Section II have further motivated
questions around the uptake of secure communication tools and
their security-related features. Hence, we studied both novices
and people with prior experience in using Telegram to contrast
their experiences. We conducted a two-part study to map the
factors impacting adoption and effective use of Telegram. The
interview results showed that participants were not making
regular use of the features of the Secret Chat mode. Hence, we
conducted a usability inspection to understand if the UI was a
potential source of confusion for users.
V. USER STUDY
In this section, we give an overview of our user study,
detail participant demographics, and describe the task-based
scenario, complementary study questionnaires, and post-study
interview plan.
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A. Method
1) Participants: We recruited our participants via UCL’s
Psychology Subject Pool. We asked prospective participants
to complete a short online pre-screening questionnaire, pro-
viding basic demographic information (e.g., gender, age) and
contact details (e.g., name, email address). We also provided
participants with a list of different communication tools, asking
them to (1) indicate which tools they currently or previously
used, and (2) name any other tools they had used which were
not on the list – Telegram was among the choices.
Overall, 210 individuals completed the pre-screening ques-
tionnaire, 27 of whom reported having used Telegram. We
divided the pool of eligible participants into sub-groups based
upon these demographics, with the aim of achieving a balance
of age and gender in both groups: novices (first-time users)
and users who have used the tool. We selected 11 novices and
11 users of Telegram to bound a focused, exploratory study.
Overall, 22 participants took part in our study, 12 females
(six novices and six users) and 10 male participants (five
novices and five users). Mean age was 31 (range: 19–75). Four
completed high-school education, 14 had an undergraduate
degree (e.g., BA, BSc), and four had a higher degree (e.g.,
MA, MSc, PhD). Our participants used several communication
tools on three computing platforms: Android (14), iOS (7) and
Windows (1).
2) Task-based scenario: We designed a face-to-face labo-
ratory session consisting of both a task-based scenario using
Telegram and a post-study interview (lasting for approximately
one hour). Upon arrival, a participant would be told the general
objective of the study, which was the assessment of the user
experience of Telegram. The individual’s rights as a participant
were also outlined, supported by a printed information sheet
and a consent form. The examination of perceptions around
security was explicitly mentioned in a debrief as part of the
post-study interview to invite participants to further reflect
upon the UI and functionality of Telegram. Each participant
received a £10 Amazon voucher for their participation.
We asked novices to install Telegram on their own personal
mobile devices, rather than using a device which would be
unfamiliar and could hinder use of the tool. We maintained
back-up mobile devices in the event of technical problems
(Nexus 6, Android 6.0; iPhone 6, iOS 10.1.1). Four participants
used these; two Android users and two iOS users. After
installation, novices were given time to explore the features
of the tool.
Participants were introduced to a researcher with whom
they would communicate during a structured scenario. In the
scenario, the researcher acted as a trustworthy colleague, with
whom they ran a (fictional) small business. They were required
to send ‘sensitive’ financial details using Telegram in order to
complete a mock purchase. Participants referred to a paper
booklet containing a randomly generated credit card number,
card validation value (CVV), and card expiry date. We asked
participants to treat these details in the same way they would
treat their own sensitive information. Participants were free to
choose which chat mode (default or Secret Chat) to send the
sensitive information with no prompting from researchers, and
were encouraged to think aloud throughout the activity.
We then asked participants to send a greeting to the
‘colleague’, who would then prompt them to start a Secret Chat
conversation. Upon switching to the Secret Chat mode, partic-
ipants were asked to give first impressions of the summary of
security features displayed to them (as shown in Figure 3), and
to test the self-destruct timer.
3) SUS: Upon completing the study tasks, our partici-
pants were asked to complete the SUS questionnaire, a tool
commonly used to assess the usability of technologies [13].
The SUS is a 10-item questionnaire for capturing subjec-
tive assessments of usability. Each question has five possible
responses on a Likert scale, ranging from “Strongly agree”
to “Strongly disagree”. SUS is generally used after use of
a system or product, but before any debrief. Many studies
have considered SUS to be a good indicator of perceived
usability [59], and it has been used, for instance, to assess
secure email systems [52], [53].
4) Post-study interview: After completing the SUS ques-
tionnaire, participants were asked about their general impres-
sions of Telegram. The interviewer would also explore partici-
pants’ opinions of other tools that they had used, and how they
compared to Telegram. This was also an opportunity to explore
perceptions of security, privacy and information sensitivity.
Notable events during the session would be revisited during
the post-study interview (e.g., whether the use of one chat
mode or the other was incidental or deliberate). This may in
turn be influenced by real-life experiences and approaches to
sharing sensitive information.
5) Pilot study: We conducted a pilot study to calibrate
the study design and protocol (e.g., duration, response to
technology failures). We used the common practice of con-
venience sampling [29], selecting six colleagues and friends
(three novices and three users of Telegram).
6) Data analysis: The study sessions were recorded and
the recordings were transcribed. All transcripts were coded
by two researchers using Thematic Analysis [12]. First, three
researchers coded five transcripts and created their codebooks
independently. Then, they met to discuss the themes and the
most suitable codes to capture them. One researcher then uni-
fied the codebooks into one. The unified codebook was used by
two researchers to code the 22 interviews in batches, meeting
weekly to discuss the meaning of participant statements, and
revise the codes by adding, merging and removing codes. The
results presented in the following sections of the paper reflect
the agreed themes.
7) Research ethics: The study was reviewed and approved
by UCL’s Research Ethics Committee (project no.: 3615/008).
At the start of each session, we asked our participants to
read an information sheet and sign a consent form outlining
the study. We emphasised that all data collected was treated
as strictly confidential, and handled in accordance with the
provisions of the UK Data Protection Act (registration no.:
Z6364106/2016/02/71). Participants had the option to with-
draw at any point during the study without needing to provide
a reason. The SIM card used by the experimenter was solely
purchased for the purpose of the study and destroyed after the
last study session.
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B. Results
First, we report the SUS scores provided by our participants
to assess the usability of Telegram. Second, we present the key
themes that emerged across both the ‘think aloud’ task scenario
and post-task interviews. We report how many participants
mentioned each theme to give an indication of the frequency
and distribution of key points. Discussion was participant-led,
meaning that the frequency of themes across the participant
group may be lower than the real frequency; a participant not
mentioning a belief does not mean that they do not hold that
belief. We use the following prefixes: ‘PN’ for novices, and
‘PU’ for users.
1) SUS: We Asked participants to complete the SUS ques-
tionnaire, facilitating a quantitative comparison of usability
across participants, especially given that we interviewed both
novices and users of Telegram. SUS scores range from 0 to
100. Table I in the Appendix shows the SUS scores for each
group (novices and users).
Bangor et al. analysed 2,324 SUS surveys from 206 usabil-
ity tests over a ten-year period, and derived a set of acceptabil-
ity ranges (‘not acceptable’, ‘marginal’, and ‘acceptable’) to
generally describe the usability perceived by users [9]. Later, a
letter-grade scale (A, B, C, D and F) was used to interpret SUS
scores. Bangor et al. also associated specific ranges of SUS
scores with adjective descriptions (e.g., excellent, good, poor).
In our study, Telegram’s SUS scores of 83.4 (novices) and 81.8
(users) indicate that Telegram has “excellent” usability (letter
grade: B). The difference between the scores of the two groups
of participants was not statistically significant (unpaired t-test,
t = 0.36, p = 0.72).
2) Adoption and abandonment of Telegram: We asked the
prior users of Telegram to tell us the story of how they adopted
the tool. For seven of them, the tool was suggested to them by
one of their contacts. Eight participants said that they explicitly
chose it for reasons relating to security. For example, PU06
used Telegram when taking part in a protest: “people at the
time downloaded Telegram to send messages to talk about
situations at their sites.”
Three participants stated that they tried Telegram out
of curiosity. Nine participants associated Telegram with low
popularity, and saw this as an obstacle to continued use. PU04
explained: “I personally would prefer to move to Telegram
’cause I don’t like Facebook as a company but so few people
use it that I’m still stuck using WhatsApp for most things.”
Out of 11 users of Telegram, seven stated that they used
Telegram for casual conversations rather than sensitive content,
and seven mentioned that they used the tool to keep in
touch with some of their contacts who were using Telegram
exclusively. Six users of Telegram mentioned that they stopped
using the tool because it does not support voice calls, as
opposed to WhatsApp and Viber.
Upon arrival to the lab, we asked participants in the user
group if they still had Telegram installed on their phone. Out
of 11 participants, six stated they had uninstalled it, whereas
four said that they still had the tool on their phone due to
having sufficient storage space to be able to keep it there.
3) Secret Chat: Eight of 11 novices did not encounter
the Secret Chat mode during the initial exploration, despite
encouragement to explore Telegram and assurance that they
could take as much time as they felt was necessary to do so.
The other four novices believed that tapping on a contact’s
name, to begin messaging them, would enter the Secret Chat
mode, not the default chat mode (as also uncovered during the
usability inspection described in Section VI-B).
Five participants (three novices and two users) associated
Secret Chat with one-to-one chat; i.e., a private chat mode
to message only one person rather than multiple users. Tele-
gram’s default mode supports group conversations, whereas
Secret Chat does not. PN05 questioned whether “the recipient
uses the Secret Chat mode” if the sender initiates a Secret
Chat session, viewing the modes as options that senders and
recipients can choose from independently. PU16 believed they
had always been using the Secret Chat mode for group chats,
despite this not being supported.
Starting a Secret Chat session with a contact prompts a
list of the mode’s security features, specifically: “use E2E
encryption”, “leave no trace on our servers”, “have a self-
destruct timer”, and “do not allow forwarding” (Fig. 3). Below,
we review participants’ perceptions of these features. We also
discuss participants’ views on verification fingerprints.
Using E2E encryption. Out of 22 participants, 20 (11
novices and nine users) told us that they had heard of the
term “encryption”. Two participants (PU16 and PU17) stated
they did not know what encryption meant.
When asked about encryption, six participants (three
novices and three users) provided explanations relating to
security and safety. These included “an extra barrier of
security”, “more time is needed to know the content of the
message”, and “making chats safe from hacking until they get
deleted from the servers.”
Regarding the barrier analogy, some participants variously
referred to encryption as “a security blanket around the
message”, “a password to unlock the message”, “hiding the
message in a box”, “a message protected by a series of
programs”, “covering the IP address of devices”, “a message
cannot be intercepted by other people”, and “a thread or
tunnel is used to exchange messages through.” The capacity
to see what is in a message was also alluded to by a number
of participants, such as “writing a message in a way only the
sender and recipients can understand”, “sending a message in
a different format”, “using all sorts of numbers to jumble up
the message”, “looking like gobbledygook to people outside”,
“seeing a bunch of signs that do not make sense when
reading an encrypted message”, and “turning the language
into something else for reading the other device.”
Overall, 17 participants (nine novices and eight users)
offered explanations for what the ‘ends’ were in E2E-encrypted
communications, including: sender and recipient; sender and
recipient’s phones; sender and Telegram’s server; the start and
end of a message body.
In terms of the role of encryption in protecting messages,
participants variously mentioned that a person who does
not have the phone number cannot read the message, that
a special piece of software (not Telegram) is necessary to
decrypt a message, and that encryption is ineffective against
people sitting next to the sender/recipient. We found that 20
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participants believed that “someone” could access and read
E2E-encrypted messages. These entities included government
agencies, Telegram’s service providers (sometimes referred to
as “staff”), competing companies (e.g., Apple, Google), and
tech-savvy people (sometimes referred to as “hackers” by our
participants).
Leaving no trace on servers. Out of the 22 participants,
one novice (PN07) linked “no traces” to protecting the meta-
data of communications, stating that Telegram claims to protect
meta-data including users’ online/offline status, their location,
the identities of the communicating parties, and how many
messages have been exchanged. The 21 remaining participants
believed that leaving no traces on servers meant that exchanged
messages would not be stored on Telegram’s servers, confusing
it with the functionality of the self-destruct timer (which is
discussed next).
Having a self-destruct timer. Telegram claims that mes-
sages sent via Secret Chat can (in principle) self-destruct,
that is, disappear from both the sender and recipient’s devices
after a period of time with no copy of exchanged messages
persisting on Telegram’s servers. 12 participants (seven novices
and five users) said that Secret Chat’s self-destruct timer is
useful for sending sensitive information, but not for daily
conversations (where ‘daily’ was regularly equated to the
conversation being trivial). Similarly, the capacity to keep a
log of exchanged messages (the ‘chat history’) was seen as
important. Several participants believed that message expiry
was defeated by the capacity to take a picture of their phone’s
screen (including timed messages). All prior users of Telegram
explicitly mentioned that they had not set up the timer for
sending a message. Some participants (three novices and seven
users) also doubted how effective the feature is because, as
PN05 put it, “the practical thing is that nothing in electronic
media is ever destroyed.”
The understanding of what the self-destruct timer did
varied across participants: some thought that all their previous
messages would be destroyed once a timer had been set up,
whereas others were unsure if the messages would also be
destroyed in the recipient’s phone (as likened to Facebook
Messenger). Similarly, there was confusion as to whether both
the sender and recipient would have to forcibly or bilaterally
set up the timer to the same amount of time, and whether the
timer is applicable to group conversations. PN11 believed that
the default chat mode should have a self-destruct timer, instead
of the timer being exclusive to Secret Chat, judging sensitivity
on a message-by-message basis: “first of all if it’s encrypted
for all messages, which would be safer and more useful and
then if the timer is made available on a regular chat and if
you need to use it, you use it; otherwise you don’t.”
No forwarding. 17 participants (six novices and 11 users)
considered the “no forwarding” feature as not useful because
messages could still be copied and pasted, and taking screen-
shots is possible (where Telegram v3.16.1 detects the taking
of screenshots, but does not prevent it).
Verification fingerprints. When the user taps on a con-
tact’s name within the Secret Chat mode, a screen entitled
“Encryption Key” is presented, as shown in Fig. 4. Public-key
fingerprints are used for verifying the identities of communi-
cating parties. All 22 participants were unsure of the usefulness
of fingerprints, where all 11 users of Telegram had not used this
feature despite their experience with the tool. They variously
speculated that the image is the encrypted message sent to
the recipient, the key used to encrypt/decrypt, or a sign that
messages sent via the Secret Chat mode are E2E-encrypted.
4) Comparison of chat modes: When we asked participants
to send fabricated payment card numbers to their mock col-
league (as per the task scenario described in Section V-A2),
seven novices sent it via Secret Chat, and four used the default
chat. In the group of Telegram users, two participants used the
Secret Chat while nine used the default mode.
We asked participants to tell us if they saw any differences
between the two chat modes in Telegram. Overall, 17 partici-
pants said that the Secret Chat mode was more secure than the
default chat mode, and nine pointed at the four features that the
Secret Chat advertises to its users. 12 participants speculated
that the default chat mode offered no encryption of messages,
whereas two participants expressed hope – rather than pointing
to particular listed features – that the default chat had some
form of encryption. Furthermore, three participants stated that
the default chat mode had some encryption, but that it was
weaker than that of the Secret Chat. 11 participants stated that
only the timer was the distinguishing feature that made the
Secret Chat more secure. Five participants stressed that the
default chat mode was equivalent to other messaging tools,
such as WhatsApp.
Eight users of Telegram stated that they had never used
Secret Chat, and five stressed that they did not feel they com-
municated information that was sensitive enough to warrant
using it. Seven participants also mentioned that Secret Chat is
not useful because it does not support group conversations.
5) Sharing of sensitive information: After the scenario
tasks, we asked participants if they had ever used a com-
munication tool to share their own payment card numbers
– or any other information that they regarded as sensitive –
with others in real life. Most participants had experience with
sharing payment card numbers with others, where participants
preferred in-person sharing. 11 of the 22 participants stated
that they had shared sensitive information over the phone.
Eight of them argued that phone calls were more secure than
text messages, and three mentioned calls as being more secure
than email messages. Otherwise, three participants reported
splitting up a number into segments and sending it by different
communication methods to the same recipient, or by the same
method to several different recipients (e.g., family members).
C. Secure communications
The discussions around the two chat modes and encryption
often led to more general questions of what “secure commu-
nications” mean to our participants. Out of 22 participants,
13 equated security with confidentiality. For PU2, “security”
meant “the fact you can send something to someone without
somebody else, even if they know you.” Specifically, three
participants took security to mean making sure the right person
is receiving their messages.
1) Comparison with other messaging tools: Overall, 21
participants made some comparison between Telegram and
other messaging tools during the session. 16 participants (eight
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novices and eight users) stated that it was similar to WhatsApp,
where 10 of these found the UIs to be very similar. PN09 won-
dered if Telegram and WhatsApp were developed by the same
company, whereas PU06 stated: “I basically think Telegram
is a fake version of WhatsApp. I don’t know, everything is
similar. With some. . . other functions that are not relevant to
me.” 15 participants (nine novices and six users) believed that
Telegram had more options than WhatsApp. Four participants
described Telegram as faster, and three of them mentioned
photo downloads being smoother. In terms of security, 12
participants (eight novices and four users) felt that Telegram
was more secure than WhatsApp.
2) Security and privacy settings: Telegram has several
privacy and security settings, some analogous to features
found in other popular messaging tools, such as WhatsApp
and Facebook Messenger. These include the ability to block
contacts, a visible “last seen” status for contacts, and active
sessions. Here, we explore participants’ perceptions of three
security-specific functions: passcode, two-step verification and
account deletion.
All but one participant (PN09) believed that a passcode was
used to lock their Telegram account, whereas PN09 associated
passcodes with specific chat sessions. Eight participants, four
in each group, felt that a passcode would provide “extra
security”, however, two novices and three users saw the feature
as lacking usefulness because the participant could not know
who the sender is, and what the content of the messages
received is. Forgetting a passcode was seen as a risk, resulting
in the loss of prior messages and a need to reinstall Telegram.
Eight novices implied that they would set a passcode, whereas
nine users of Telegram had not done so, seeing the phone
lock of their handset as sufficient (i.e., Apple’s Touch ID or
passcode, and Android’s pattern/PIN lock).
Telegram has an optional two-step verification feature to
further verify users when logging into their accounts from a
new device (in addition to the verification code). However,
only two novices and one user understood the two-step ver-
ification feature after reading the description of the feature
on the screen. 17 participants (eight novices and nine users)
equated this feature with two-factor authentication, seeing it as
analogous to having an additional password for online banking
and email accounts. Based on this belief, participants said that
setting two passwords is “a hassle” (PU18), and “having one
password is enough” (PU20). PU21 believed that the feature
is used to reset a password, which may be attributed to them
not having used the feature before. None of the 11 users of
Telegram had used this security feature before.
Telegram allows users to delete their accounts, and ac-
counts are automatically deleted after a period of inactivity.
Although five novices and one user perceived the feature as
useful, many participants (six novices and ten users) would
prefer to receive a notification that their account would be
deleted. Several participants believed that uninstalling a tool
would also remove their account; five participants expressed a
wish to keep a copy of their chat history.
VI. USABILITY INSPECTION
A. Method
Usability inspection is an approach used to find usability
problems in UI design [44]. Evaluating a design without users
can identify problems that may not necessarily be revealed by
an evaluation with users [19], [36], [40], [44]. It is important to
bring users into the design process, but evaluating the design
when no users are present can also provide benefits [36]. There
are several different usability inspection methods, where we
use a hybrid approach combining two methods: cognitive walk-
through and heuristic evaluation. Both methods are actively
used in human-computer interaction (HCI) research [32].
1) Cognitive walkthrough: Cognitive walkthrough focuses
on evaluating a design for its exploratory learnability, a key
aspect of usability testing [56] based on a cognitive model
of learning and use [39], [48], [61]. Users may prefer to
learn a system by exploring it, rather than investing time in
comprehensive formal training [14], [23]. A cognitive walk-
through identifies problems users can have as they approach
an interface for the first time, as well as mismatches between
users’ and designers’ conceptualisation of a task and the
assumptions made by designers about users’ knowledge of a
specific task (which can for example impact the labelling of
buttons).
Cognitive walkthrough is task-specific, studying one or
more specific user tasks. The process comprises a prepara-
tory phase and an analysis phase. In the preparatory phase,
reviewers decide and agree on the input to the cognitive
walkthrough process: (1) a detailed description of the UI,
(2) its likely user population and context of use, (3) a task
scenario, and (4) a sequence of actions that users should
accurately perform to successfully complete the designated
task. In the analysis phase, analysts examine each of the
user actions needed to accomplish the task. The evaluation
procedure follows a structured series of questions, derived
from a theory of exploratory learning, to evaluate each step
(or action) in the task workflow. A detailed overview of the
cognitive walkthrough procedure can be found in [61].
2) Heuristic evaluation: Heuristic evaluation involves hav-
ing usability evaluators judge dialogue elements in an interface
against established usability principles (or “heuristics”) [44],
[45]. Ten principles, derived by Nielsen and Molich in 1990,
can be found in [45]. The use of a complete and detailed
list of usability heuristics as a checklist is considered to
add formalism. Jeffries et al. found that heuristic evaluation
uncovered more issues than any other evaluation methods,
whereas empirical usability testing (user testing) revealed more
severe, recurring and global problems that are likely to impede
users [35].
3) Hybrid approach: To avoid biases inherent in either of
the inspection methods, we used a hybrid approach combining
the two methods. Combining both task scenarios and heuris-
tics was recommended by Nielsen [43] and Sears [55]. The
procedure is as follows:
1) Provide a detailed description of the UI.
2) Define the users and their goals.
3) Define the tasks the users would attempt (e.g., send-
ing a message).
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4) Break each task into a sequence of sub-tasks (or
actions).
5) Walk through each task workflow step-by-step
through the lens of the user (e.g., what terms they
use, the things they would look for, the likely paths
they would take).
6) For each action, look for and identify problems based
on a set of heuristics (or guidelines).
7) Specify where in the UI the problem is, how severe
it is, and possible design fixes.
Two researchers inspected the UI of Telegram using the
hybrid approach, doing so independently before discussing
the results. A third researcher read both evaluation reports,
identifying usability issues in each report and aggregating all
the uncovered usability problems in a larger set.
4) Privacy by design: Apart from assessing Telegram us-
ing usability inspection methods, we also examined the tool
using the seven foundational principles of Privacy by Design,
as defined by Cavoukian [15]. The principles advocate that
systems should be designed with the preservation of privacy
as a requirement, and that settings that ensure security and
privacy should be the default.
B. Results
We used a hybrid approach combining cognitive walk-
through and heuristic evaluation to assess the usability of
Telegram based on a set of tasks. In any messaging tool, users
perform two core tasks: sending and receiving messages [60].
In secure communication tools, users would normally need to
perform additional security tasks, such as deciding whether
to manually encrypt/digitally sign messages. However, Tele-
gram secures all messages by default without user interaction.
Hence, our focus is on evaluating the two core tasks of sending
and receiving messages, and the related security and privacy
settings offered by Telegram. We evaluated Telegram v3.16.1
on both iPhone 6 (iOS 10.1.1) and Nexus 6 (Android 6.0.1).
We did not find any meaningful differences for the tasks
studied between these two devices.
As shown in Fig. 1, the user is presented with three ways
of sending a message: “New Group”, “New Secret Chat”, and
“New Channel”. However, tapping on a contact’s name in
the list underneath (here: Kat) directs the user to the default
chat mode, without giving them the option to choose between
either the default chat mode or Telegram’s Secret Chat mode.
The default chat mode is not displayed as an option, but
is activated once the user taps on the contact’s name. This
violates Nielsen’s criterion of visibility of system status, which
stresses that the system should always keep users informed
about what is happening [32].
When starting a Secret Chat session with a contact (here:
Kat), Telegram provides a list of the security features offered
by this mode (Fig. 3). The four bullet points state that Secret
Chats “use end-to-end encryption”, “leave no trace on our
servers”, “have a self-destruct timer”, and “do not allow
forwarding”. The terms assume a familiarity with technical
terminology, and there is no direct link to further explanation.
This violates Nielsen’s heuristic of match between system and
the real world, which states that the system should speak the
users’ language, with words, phrases and concepts familiar
Fig. 1. Options to send a message in Telegram.
to users, rather than system-oriented terms [32] – as seen in
Section V-B3, participants differed in how they perceive and
articulate security terminology.
The security properties of the default chat mode are also
not clear (Fig. 2). Once users start exchanging messages, the
visible difference between being in a default chat and a Secret
Chat is minimal. As shown in Figures 2 and 3, there is a small
padlock symbol to the left of the contact’s name in a Secret
Chat session. This also violates Nielsen’s criterion of visibility
of system status [32], as described above.
To start a Secret Chat with someone, the contact has to
be online for the two participating devices to exchange keys
(Fig. 5, Appendix). This might push the user to send messages
within the default chat mode if their contact is not online. The
Secret Chat mode also does not support creation of a group
chat, which can further undermine the mode’s usefulness.
When the user taps on the contact’s name within the
Secret Chat mode, a screen entitled “Encryption Key” is
presented (Fig. 4). Displayed is a square image containing
smaller squares of different shades of blue, and four lines
of characters and numbers underneath. The explanation found
below this states that the image and text were derived from
the encryption key for the Secret Chat with ‘Kat’. In this case,
if the representations are the same on the sender’s and Kat’s
devices, “end-to-end encryption is guaranteed”.
The tool uses the term “Encryption Key” to describe a
verification fingerprint, which could lead users to think that
the fingerprint is the encryption key used to encrypt messages.
When a Secret Chat session with a contact is initiated, an
image and a textual representation are generated on both the
sender and recipient’s devices, visualising their public-key
fingerprints. The two communicating parties can verify each
other’s identities by comparing both representations through a
trusted channel (e.g., in person). If the representations match,
the session is secure, and no man-in-the-middle attack has
occurred.
Finally, under the “Privacy and Security” settings, users
can set up a passcode (4-digit PIN) to lock the application.
However, we found that when Telegram is locked, users
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Fig. 2. Default chat mode. Fig. 3. Secret Chat mode. Fig. 4. A verification fingerprint.
can receive notifications about messages without the sender’s
name and text. Another usability issue related to locking the
application is that users can either enable “auto-lock” after a
specified period of inactivity, or manually lock the application
from the screen, which is not explained to the user at the time
of enabling the lock (Fig. 6 and 7).
We found Telegram was in violation of at least four of the
principles of privacy by design. The second principle states
that privacy should be the default setting, whereas in Telegram
the user is guided towards the default chat mode, which is
less secure and less private. This finding also violates the
sixth principle, which stresses visibility and transparency. If
the user chooses the Secret Chat mode, they will not enjoy
full functionality (principle 4) because the other party has to be
online, and group chats are not possible. The default chat mode
does not offer “end-to-end protection” (principle 5) because it
does not support E2E encryption.
VII. DISCUSSION
Visible security can increase trust in a security system (e.g.,
[53]); our results indicate that making some security features
visible, while at the same time leaving others as invisible, can
create confusion for users. Many participants believed that
both modes offered the same security properties, except for
the self-destruct timer which was regarded as the most visible
feature of the Secret Chat mode (and as such an indicator
of that mode’s level of security). Having two clearly distinct
chat modes, and more so, the less secure mode as the default,
can lead to confusion and error. Design principles, such as
those proposed by Nielsen and Molich [45], are still not being
followed in the design of communication tools.
Similarly, one model of (visible) security cannot be as-
sumed to resonate with all users of a secure communication
tool. Engagement with users exposed many different explana-
tions and metaphors, even across our relatively small cohort
of participants. Participants routinely compared Telegram to
other communication tools they have used. This can have
methodological implications, potentially requiring that assess-
ing a tool happens alongside other tools that a user is familiar
with or can contrast use against (e.g., side-by-side comparison
has been seen to elicit different perspectives for CAPTCHA
alternatives [37]).
The study of novices and users was invaluable: SUS
scores indicated high usability across both groups, whereas
engagement with prior users found that most had stopped using
Telegram (because in most cases their contacts were using
another messaging tool). In this sense, messaging is a naturally
social practice, where peer influence can govern the adoption
and use of encrypted communication tools [17], [18]. PU04
explained that the security of their communications also lied
in the hands of other people: “I worry about people being able
to access it sort of semi-legitimately. . . the fact that someone
I send a message to loses their phone on a drunken night out
and someone gets access to it.”
A. Limitations
The design of the task-based scenario did not involve a real
risk for participants, where an element of personal risk in the
task may motivate participants to give consideration to more
secure behaviours [38]. Here, the study tasks were considered
more as an opportunity for participants to learn about the
tool and promote further discussion of available features. Prior
users may have made a choice between the default chat and
the Secret Chat modes out of awareness or incidentally – in all
cases, the choice was explored in the post-study interview. That
Telegram’s messaging modes could be referred to separately
was used to support this discussion.
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Results showed that participants described encryption in
different ways. Researchers had to take care not to introduce
jargon into the conversation with participants before they
had the chance to frame concepts in their words (where
participants’ own perceptions of encryption proved interesting,
as in Section V-B3).
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We applied two evaluation methods to study Telegram; a
lab-based user study (11 novices and 11 users of Telegram)
and a hybrid analytical approach combining cognitive walk-
through and heuristic evaluation. Both evaluation methods
found that the distinct chat modes, rather than promoting
choice, have the potential to create confusion for users. In-
dividuals likely choose a messaging tool based on how many
of their regular contacts use it, rather than specific security
features. Additionally, they may rarely or never share sensitive
content with others, or do so through some other method
(e.g., a phone call). Results demonstrated that people can have
unique experiences and mental models of security and secure
communications. Telegram is not necessarily a good fit; the
tool may serve as a ‘security blanket’, creating an indistinct
sense of security and limiting opportunity for individuals to
grow as security-minded users. Future work could adapt the
approach of recruiting novices and non-novices to study other
communication tools and security-related features.
We make the following recommendations: (1) designers,
developers, practitioners and researchers should apply usability
inspection methods in a consistent fashion, following estab-
lished design principles. Our findings would suggest that this
is not being done; (2) secure communication capabilities ought
to be developed in a way that does not limit utility or make
implicit assumptions about how tools will be used (especially
for the sharing of sensitive information or the preservation of
privacy); (3) messaging tools that incorporate security features
should follow a strategy for including users of varying levels
of security expertise.
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APPENDIX
A. SUS scores
Novices Users
Identifier SUS Score Identifier SUS Score
PN01 82.5 PU01 92.5
PN02 97.5 PU02 100
PN03 75.0 PU03 92.5
PN04 95.0 PU04 75.0
PN05 70.0 PU05 87.5
PN06 77.5 PU06 67.5
PN07 70.0 PU07 77.5
PN08 82.5 PU08 67.5
PN09 97.5 PU09 80.0
PN10 82.5 PU10 85.0
PN11 87.5 PU11 75.0
Mean 83.4 Mean 81.8
TABLE I. SUS SCORES GIVEN BY NOVICES AND USERS OF TELEGRAM PARTICIPATING IN THE STUDY.
B. Additional figures
Fig. 5. Starting a Secret Chat with a contact. Fig. 6. Unlocked padlock. Fig. 7. Locking Telegram by closing the padlock.
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